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By using university administrative and survey data on Italian graduates, we analyse the intergenerational trans- 
mission of liberal professions. We find that having a father who is a liberal professional has a positive and 
significant effect on the probability of a graduate of becoming a liberal professional. To assess the processes at 
work in this intergenerational transmission, we evaluate the effect of having a liberal professional father on the 
probabilities to undertake each of the compulsory steps required to become a liberal professional, which are 
choosing a university degree providing access to a liberal profession, completing a period of practice, passing 
a licensing exam and starting a liberal profession. Having a liberal professional father has a positive and sta- 
tistically significant effect on the probability to complete a compulsory period of practice and to start a liberal 
profession; whereas there does not seem to be an effect on the type of degree chosen and on passing the licensing 
examination, at least after controlling for child ’s and parental formal human capital. 
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0. Introduction 
The focus of this paper is on explaining why children of liberal pro-
essional fathers have a larger probability to become liberal profession-
ls. We consider liberal professionals who are self-employed workers
roviding public services which require them to hold a specific univer-
ity degree, to obtain a professional license by passing an exam and to
omplete a compulsory period of practice, which has to be undertaken
efore the licensing exam. 1 
By using university administrative data linked with post-graduation
urveys covering the universe of graduates in 22 Italian Public Universi-
ies in 2002 and 2003, we find that the probability of a graduate child to
ecome a liberal professional increases of 9 (16) percentage points when
he father is a graduate liberal professional rather than an entrepreneur
a blue collar). These are huge increases, given that only 13% of gradu-
tes become liberal professionals. 
Similarly to the intergenerational transmission of income, the oc-
upational transmission has been explained by inheritability of en-
owments and parents ’ investments in their child ’s human capital (see∗ Corresponding author. 
E-mail address: carmen.aina@uniupo.it (C. Aina). 
1 The liberal professionals considered in our empirical exercise are accountants, 
awyers, notaries, psychologists, pharmacists and architects. In some of our auxiliary anal- 
ses, which are available upon request to the authors, we also include liberal professions 
hat do not require a compulsory period of practice, i.e. engineers, geo-biologists and 
gronomists. 
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ransmission for different occupations, it is necessary to recognise that
here are two types of human capital investments: the indirect invest-
ent through formal education and the direct investment through the
ransmission of job-specific abilities and knowledge from fathers to chil-
ren (see Laband and Lentz, 1983; 1992, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989,
unn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000, Fairlie and Robb, 2007 and Fairlie and
rashinsky, 2012 ). Liberal professions are a type of occupation where
he intergenerational transmission of skills and knowledge is important
nd helps in lowering the entry barrier costs, e.g. shortening the time
eeded to set a portfolio of customers and increasing potential early
rofits. 
If parental human capital investments were the only explanation for
he occupational transmission from fathers to children, then there would
e no reason for thinking that a high degree of occupational transmis-
ion is unfair. However, other possible mechanisms explaining the trans-
ission of liberal professions are: the transfer of financial resources,
ob preferences, family networking and the potential transmission of
he family business. 2 Furthermore, an additional mechanism which can
xplain the large intergenerational association in liberal professions is2 For a review of papers on intergenerational mobility see Solon (1999) , Björklund and 
antti (2009) , Erikson and Goldthorpe (2002) , Ermisch et al. (2012) and Torche (2015) . 
r 2017 
r the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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h  epotism, i.e. the fact that liberal professional fathers can help their
hildren beyond their merits to be accepted and to complete a period of
ractice, to pass a licensing exam, or to undertake other steps required
o become a liberal professional. 3 
We are unable to evaluate the separate effect of nepotism; but, after
ontrolling for variables which measure child ’s and parental formal hu-
an capital, and child ’s job preferences and family financial resources,
e can interpret the residual effect of having a liberal professional father
n the probability of becoming a liberal professional as the combined ef-
ect of transmission of job-specific skills and knowhow, nepotism, family
etworking and potential inheritance of the family business. While we
apture the formal human capital by controlling for a rich set of mea-
ures of educational choices and attainments in high school and univer-
ity using administrative data, which are unlikely to suffer of measure-
ent errors; our measures of financial resources and job preferences
re proxy variables which might not fully control for the two related
ransmission mechanisms. Nevertheless, because we compute the effect
f having a liberal professional father on the probability of becoming a
iberal professional as the differential effect with respect to having a fa-
her who is an entrepreneur and the transmission of financial resources
nd job preferences is likely to be very similar between fathers who
re entrepreneurs and liberal professionals, we expect the potential bias
aused by these proxy variables to be small. 
The novelty of our paper is that we decompose for the first time the
robability of a graduate to become liberal professional in the product of
our probabilities (processes) which represent four sequential steps that
 child has to undertake to start a liberal profession, which are choosing
egrees providing access to liberal professions which require practice
eriod, completing a compulsory period of practice, obtaining a profes-
ional licensing and starting a liberal profession. This approach allows
s to evaluate the effect of having a liberal professional father in each of
hese four specific processes and to explain how this effect is mediated
y different mechanisms. In this way we can identify which process is
he most important in explaining the intergenerational transmission of
iberal professions, and therefore we can provide more precise policy
ecommendations to improve access to liberal professions. 
Our approach is similar in spirit to Mare ’s educational transition
odel, which estimates the effect of parental background on the prob-
bility of progressing from one educational level to the next using a
equential binary model (see Mare, 1979; 1980; 1981; 2011 ). The main
ifference is that, rather than evaluating the effect of family background
n school transitions, we estimate the effect of parental occupation on
equential probability processes, which represent sequential steps that
 child has to undertake to become a liberal professional. 
More precisely, we consider the full sample of graduates and estimate
he effect of having a father who is a liberal professional on each of four
ollowing probability processes: 
.a the probability to choose university degrees that give access to lib-
eral professions which require a compulsory period of practice, 
.b the probability to complete a compulsory period of practice, 
.c the probability of passing a professional licensing exam, 
.d the probability to start a liberal profession. 
Each of these probabilities is conditional on having undertaken the
revious step, i.e. completing a period of practice is conditional on hav-
ng a degree that gives access to liberal professions which require a
ompulsory period of practice, passing a professional licensing exam is
onditional on having completed a period of compulsory practice, and
tarting a liberal profession is conditional on having obtained a license.
herefore, the probability to become a liberal professional for a gradu-3 We define nepotism as any advantageous effect of the family network which is not 
eritocratic. 
p
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109 te is given by the product of the above four conditional probabilities
[I.a], [I.b], [I.c] and [I.d]), which are sequential probabilities. 4 
Our findings suggest that the completion of a compulsory period of
ractice and the liberal profession initiation are the major processes at
ork in the transmission of liberal professions from fathers to children.
n the contrary, the type of degree choice and the licensing examina-
ion do not play a major role in explaining the transmission of liberal
rofessions. 
When controlling for the effect of the observed mechanisms of trans-
ission, i.e. for the transmission of financial resources, formal human
apital and job preferences, separately on the four different probability
rocesses, we find that the advantage of having a liberal professional
ather in the same field of study, (i) on the probability to complete a
ompulsory period of practice (process I.b), is mainly explained by the
ransmission of formal human capital followed by family networking
nd/or nepotism, (ii) on the probability to pass a licensing exam (pro-
ess I.c), is explained exclusively by formal human capital, (iii) on the
robability to start a liberal profession (process I.d), is explained by the
ransmission of the family business and possibly nepotism. 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sum-
arises the literature related to our research. Section 3 provides some
nstitutional details on the educational system and on the professional
icensing in Italy. We then describe the data in Section 4 and provide
escriptive measures of intergenerational mobility in liberal professions
n Section 5 . We assess the effects of having a liberal professional father
nd of different mediating mechanisms on the probability of becoming
 liberal professional and on the four different sequential processes of
ntergenerational transmission in Sections 6 and 7 , respectively. Finally,
ection 8 concludes. 
. Related literature 
By assuming that the cost to acquire human capital related to a spe-
ific occupation is lower for children who follow their father ’s occupa-
ion and that fathers with a child who is a follower maximise their own
arnings as well as their child ’s, Laband and Lentz (1983) develop an
conomic model which explains the mechanisms behind the intergen-
rational occupational transmission and the differences in this trans-
ission across occupations. Direct and indirect human capital transfers
rom fathers to children are assumed to be the mechanisms of inter-
enerational transmission at work, and the explanation given for why
ome types of occupations are more often transmitted than others is that
hey require job specific human capital that can be easily and cheaply
ransmitted from fathers to children. Laband and Lentz (1983) find that
or occupations where the direct transmission of job specific knowledge
nd abilities is more relevant, such as farmers and self-employed peo-
le, there is a higher percentage of children following their father ’s oc-
upation. High levels of intergenerational transmission have been found
lso by Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000) and Sørensen (2007) for self-
mployed people, by Lindquist et al. (2015) for entrepreneurs and by
ellizzari et al. (2011) for liberal professionals. 
Beside the human capital transmission, another possible explana-
ion for the strong intergenerational association is the presence of credit
arket imperfections, which may lead to a failure of meritocracy (see
vans and Jovanovic, 1989, Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000, Caselli and
ennaioli, 2005 and Fairlie and Krashinsky, 2012 ). Evans and Jo-
anovic (1989) propose an economic model for the decision to be self-
mployed, and they provide empirical evidence that wealthier people
ave higher probability of starting a self-employment activity. Dunn and4 In presence of omitted variables which affect all the above four probabilities, the com- 
utation of the probability to become a liberal professional is slightly more complicated, 
ecause it requires the estimation of a joint quadrivariate probability model that allows 
or correlation between the error components in the four probability processes. In the 
aper we show that the estimation results obtained using separate sequential probability 
odels and the joint quadrivariate probability model are similar. 
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f  oltz-Eakin (2000) extend this model to allow for financial capital
ransfers from fathers to children, so that the decision to become self-
mployed depends on the personal human and financial capital as well
s on the human and financial capital transmitted from the father.
here is also some empirical evidence that the probability of becom-
ng a self-employed worker or an entrepreneur is higher for children
hose fathers are wealthier (see Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994 and Parker and
an Praag, 2006 ). 
An additional potential explanation for the intergenerational occu-
ational mobility, which has been mentioned but not formalised in a
heoretical economic framework, is the transmission of preferences and
ttitudes from parents to children. For example, risk adverse fathers
re less likely to become entrepreneurs and probably transmit their
isk aversion to their children, who in turn will be less likely to be-
ome entrepreneurs (see Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000 and Fairlie, 2002 ).
ecker and Voskort (2014) provide some evidence on intergenerational
ransmission of risk attitudes looking at earnings risk. They find that a
hild ’s earnings risk increases by 14% of a standard deviation for one
tandard deviation increase in father ’s earnings risk. This association is
tatistically significant, but small in size. 
A further mechanism of transmission is nepotism, which may affect
he outcomes of school admission exams and licensing exams, and ul-
imately the probability of starting specific occupations. 5 It is gener-
lly difficult to distinguish the roles of nepotism and of human capital
ransfers in the intergenerational occupational transmission. This is be-
ause the intergenerational transmission of knowledge and the father ’s
ork network may increase intergenerational mobility without imply-
ng favouritism (see Magruder, 2010, Ponzo and Scoppa, 2011b and
ramarz and Skans, 2014 ). It is perhaps easier to identify the contri-
ution of nepotism when looking at exams for which the probability
f success should be independent of the father ’s occupation once the
hild ’s ability is controlled for. An example of this is the licensing exam-
nation in Italy, which is a mandatory requirement to become a liberal
rofessional. 
Such licensing examination has been often accused of favouritism
oward children of liberal professionals, but the empirical evidence is
ostly anecdotal or based on statistical analysis that cannot adequately
ontrol for the intergenerational transmission of financial resources,
ormal and informal human capital and preferences (see Basso and
abartino, 2011 ). The most convincing evidence on the effect of fa-
hers on children starting a liberal profession is given by Basso and Pel-
izzari (2010) . 6 Using local administrative registers of professionals in
taly, they find a negative relationship between the age when people
tart a legal profession and the frequency of their family name in the
ocal register. Since the frequency of their surname is likely to indicate
amily connections, the negative relation might suggest a potential ef-
ect of nepotism on the probability of passing a license. The presence
f nepotism is confirmed by a comparison of the relationship between
tarting age of a legal profession and frequency of the family names be-
ore and after the introduction of a reform aimed at reducing biases in
he marking of licensing exams. The association between starting age
nd surname frequency decreases after such intervention, indicating a
otential reduction in the nepotism effect. 
A final mechanism through which liberal professions get transmit-
ed from parents to children is the potential inheritance of the fam-
ly professional business which lower the entry barrier to the profes-
ion. Bennedsen et al. (2007) find a causal significant negative effect on5 Previous papers that have studied the effect of nepotism include Lentz and La- 
and (1989) and Arulampalam et al. (2005) , who look at school admission; Pérez- 
onzález (2006) and Bennedsen et al. (2007) , who analyse the chief executive officer 
CEO) successions; Basso and Labartino (2011) , who evaluate the effect of nepotism on 
he starting age of licensed professions; Ponzo and Scoppa (2011a ), who study its effect on 
ecruitment; and Scoppa (2009) , who estimates the intergenerational mobility of public 
ector jobs. 
6 The main results are also summarised in Basso and Labartino (2011) . 
t
E
110 rms performance of the transmission of chief executive officer (CEO)
ositions from parents to children, which seems to suggest that the
ecision to appoint a family member as CEO is not so meritocratic.
rossmann and Strulik (2010) consider the intergenerational transmis-
ion of ownership and control of a firm from parents to children. They
evelop a theoretical model to study whether preferential inheritance
ax on family firms may lead to a cost for society because of the po-
ential transmission of firms to heirs who do not necessarily have high
ntrepreneurial abilities. Calibrating the theoretical model using Ger-
an data, they actually find that preferential tax treatment of family
rms worsen macroeconomic performance. Lindquist et al. (2015) fo-
uses on the transmission of entrepreneurship from parents to children
nd, by using Swedish adoption data, they find that the most relevant
actors explaining such transmission are post-birth rather than pre-birth
actors. This result suggests that there are not strong genetic mech-
nisms explaining the intergenerational transmission of entrepreneur-
hip. Mocetti (2016) studies the intergenerational transmission of phar-
acies in Italy. He finds that an increase in the cap imposed on the
umber of pharmacies per population (a decrease in rent) leads to a
eduction in the intergenerational transmission of pharmacies, but has
o effect on the career choices of children of non-pharmacists. This ev-
dence suggests that high entry barriers provide a benefit to children of
harmacists and this advantage may lead parents to favour their child
eyond their merit. 
To summarise, the main mechanisms at play in the intergenerational
ransmission of liberal professions are: (i) formal human capital; (ii)
references for specific jobs, (iii) financial resources, (iv) job specific
uman capital (informal human capital), (v) family network, (vi) nepo-
ism, (vii) inheritance of the family business. Most of the above mecha-
isms of transmission of occupations have been emphasised also by so-
iologists, who stress that these occupational transmission mechanisms
re relevant conduits for social reproduction (e.g. Grusky and Weeden,
001, Weeden and Grusky, 2005 and Jonsson et al., 2009 ). 
Our paper is also related to the literature on intergenerational mobil-
ty and especially to contributions that study the mechanisms explaining
he transmission of occupations from parents to children. An approach
ften adopted to investigate these intergenerational mechanisms is the
ecomposition of intergenerational association in the part explained by
echanisms (such as education, cognitive and non-cognitive abilities,
nd financial resources) and in the residual part which captures the
ntergenerational association net of these mediating mechanisms. This
ype of approach was introduced by sociologists in the 60 ’s and 70 ’s
see Blau and Duncan, 1967 and Sewell and Hauser, 1975 ) and was
oon after adopted by economists (see Conslik, 1974; 1977, Atkinson,
980 and Atkinson and Jenkins, 1984 ). 7 These studies have certainly
elped in assessing the magnitude of some mechanisms in explaining
ntergenerational occupational mobility, but have left some more spe-
ific occupational transmission mechanisms unexplored. 
To sum up, the contribution of existing literature has been to un-
erline the role of different mechanisms in explaining the intergenera-
ional transmission of occupations. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence
n mechanisms is still fragmented as most of the studies focus only on
ew mechanisms and are unable to evaluate the role of each of them.
ur paper provides some more comprehensive analyses on the mecha-
isms looking at their effects on the transmission of liberal professions
rom fathers to children as well as on the different underlying processes.7 More recent empirical applications of this approach are provided by Bowles and Gin- 
is (2002) , Black and Devereux (2010) ; Blanden et al. (2007) ; Smeeding et al. (2011) and 
rmisch et al. (2012) . 
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9 We exclude students graduating in Sport Science because of the very small sample 
size. Medical schools are excluded because, contrary to all other departments, they have 
very selective admission exams and almost all medical graduates end up obtaining profes- 
sional license. Finally, the IULM is dropped from the sample because it is the only private . Institutional background 
.1. The Italian university education system 
In Italy all students with any type of high school diploma can en-
ol in a university degree. High school diplomas are upper secondary
ualifications, which are usually completed at age 18–19, and they can
e academic ( licei classici and licei scientifici ) or vocational ( istituti tecnici
nd istituti professionali ). 
In the period considered in our empirical exercise most of the Italian
niversities were public and, with the exceptions of few departments
e.g. Medical Schools and Architecture), there were no university ad-
ission exams. If students failed an exam or were unhappy with the
ark obtained, they could re-sit the exam several times. Consequently,
tudents usually took much longer than the minimum official period to
omplete their degree. Four-year degrees were usually completed in an
verage of 7.5 years, with only one in eight students completing within
 years ( ISTAT, 2000 ). 
.2. Professional licensing in Italy 
In Italy, as in many other countries, professional occupations are
ubject to a range of requirements to guarantee the acquisition of pro-
essional credentials (see Paterson et al., 2003, Catania and Monti,
011 and Pellizzari et al., 2011 ). The main four prerequisites generally
equired by all types of liberal professions are: (i) to have a university
egree in a field of study relevant for the specific liberal profession; (ii)
he acquisition of professional experience through a period of practice
nd/or specialised courses; (iii) passing a licensing exam; (iv) becoming
 member of a relevant formal professional body. 8 
Several liberal professions require a practice period spent under the
upervision of a member of the relevant professional body and prac-
itioners are not paid but may receive a fellowship. The length of the
ractice period is three years for accountants, two years for lawyers (but
an be shortened to one year by attending a Law specialization school
or two years), eighteen months for notaries, one year for psychologists,
nd six months for pharmacists and architects; while the practice period
s not mandatory for engineers, geo-biologists, and agronomists. 
The licensing exam is compulsory and consists of one or more written
ests and an oral exam. Generally, the licensing exam takes place once
er year in different provinces. There are no limits to the number of
andidates admitted to the licensing exam and to the number of times
n examination can be taken. Because the licensing exam includes an
ral exam, it is impossible to guarantee the absence of interference with
he examination committee ’s members to favour specific applicants. 
Candidates who successfully pass the licensing exam have to become
embers of a formal professional body ( Albo Professionale ) before start-
ng their liberal profession. Except for passing the licensing exam, there
re no other relevant prerequisites for the enrolment in the professional
ody. The main requirement for the members of the professional body is
o respect the code of conduct set by the body, which generally imposes
ules and restrictions on pricing, advertising and business structure. 
. Data 
We use data from AlmaLaurea, which is a consortium of Italian Uni-
ersities whose aim is to provide employers with information on gradu-
tes. Graduates fill in a questionnaire at the completion of their degree
 Profilo dei Laureati survey) and are followed and interviewed again af-
er 1, 3 and 5 years from the degree ( Condizione Occupazionale dei Laure-
ti survey). These last three interviews are computer assisted telephone
nterviews administered by trained interviewers. Information from the8 For more details on the institutional context of licensed occupations in Italy see 
atania and Monti (2011) . 
u
p
p
P
111 our interviews is matched with students ’ details contained in the uni-
ersities ’ administrative data registers, so that for each cohort of gradu-
tes AlmaLaurea is able to provide details on age, sex, area of residence,
amily background, educational choices and test scores pre and during
niversity, labour market status during and after the university, occu-
ational characteristics and wage after the degree. 
The initial survey at the completion of the degree covers almost the
hole population of new graduates from the Universities belonging to
he AlmaLaurea consortium. The response rates in these initial surveys
re usually well above 90% for each cohort of students. Looking at the
nterviews 5 years after the degree the respondents still represent more
han 80% of the population of graduates who answered the initial inter-
iew. 
.1. Sample definition 
Our sample is given by all graduates in 2002 and 2003 and inter-
iewed 5 years after graduation, i.e. in 2007 and 2008. We include
ll universities and departments belonging to the Consortium in 2002
r 2003 except for Sport Science and Medical Departments and the
ULM (Istituto Universitario di Lingue Moderne). 9 The universities in-
luded in our sample of graduates are the following 22: University of
ologna, Cassino, Catania, Chieti, Ferrara, Firenze, Genova, Messina,
odena and Reggio Emilia, Molise, Padova, Parma, Piemonte Orien-
ale, Roma LUMSA, Sassari, Siena, Torino Politecnico, Torino, Trento,
rieste, Udine, and Venezia Architecture. We do not consider students
hat are older than 40 at the completion of their degree and the few ones
hat were resident in a foreign country or with a foreign high school
iploma before starting university. 
Our final sample of graduates includes 24,309 people, and we also
onsider the three following subsamples: 
1. the subsample of graduates with degrees providing access to liberal
professions which require compulsory period of practice to obtain a
license (11,308 individuals), 10 
2. the subsample of graduates with access to liberal professions who
completed a compulsory period of practice (7,899 individuals), 
3. the subsample of graduates who completed a compulsory period of
practice and passed a licensing exam (5,601 individuals). 
Because our analysis considers only liberal professions for which the
niversity degree is mandatory, the probability of becoming a liberal
rofessional without a degree is zero and when conditioning on hav-
ng a degree we can focus on the sequential processes that occur from
he choice of the type of degree to the entry into the labour market. In
he Italian context the probability to get a university degree is much
ore related to parents ’ education than to parents ’ occupations (see
hecchi et al., 2013 ); therefore, we do not expect any strong effect of
aving a liberal professional father on the probability of graduating and
o omitting to consider the graduation probability process should not
ias our results. 
.2. Variables definitions 
.2.1. Dependent variables 
For our analysis we consider four dependent variables that are four
ummy variables taking value 1 for graduates who choose a degree pro-
iding access to liberal professions requiring a compulsory period ofniversity and has a high incidence of missing cases for most of the variables in 2002. 
10 Liberal professions requiring a period of practice are accountants, lawyers, notaries, 
sychologists, pharmacists and architects. Therefore, degrees providing access to liberal 
rofessions requiring a period of practice are Business and Economics, Law, Psychology, 
harmacy and Architecture. 
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a  ractice [I.a], and who complete a practice period [I.b], pass a profes-
ional license [I.c] and start a liberal profession within 5 years from
raduation [I.d]. Degrees for which more than 3% of the graduates
btain a professional licensing within 5 years from graduation are de-
ned as degrees giving access to liberal professions. Amongst them, the
egrees requiring a compulsory practice period are Business and Eco-
omics, Law, Psychology, Pharmacy and Architecture, whereas those
ithout mandatory practice are: Engineer, Geo-Biology, and Agricul-
ure. The degrees with no access to liberal professions are, instead, Lan-
uage and Linguistics, Modern Literature and Philosophy, Education,
olitical Science, Mathematics and Physics. 
Table A1 reports some descriptive statistics and shows that 46.5%
f graduates choose a degree that gives access to liberal professions for
hich the period of practice is mandatory, 40.7% obtain a professional
icense, and about 13.0% of graduates become a liberal professional
ithin 5 years from graduation. 
.2.2. Explanatory variables 
To explain the probability to choose a degree with access to liberal
rofessions requiring a compulsory practice, we use only child ’s charac-
eristics observed at the start of the university, to explain the probability
o complete a compulsory period of practice and to pass a licensing exam
e consider also characteristics observed at the completion of the uni-
ersity degree, finally to explain the probability to start a liberal profes-
ion we consider additionally characteristics observed once the licensing
xam has been passed. 
The characteristics at the start of the university include a set of vari-
bles that measure the child ’s formal human capital, which are: age at
he start of the university and its square term; high school final mark,
hich ranges between 36 and 60; high school type, i.e. a dummy vari-
ble taking value 1 for vocational high schools ( istituti tecnici and istituti
rofessionali ) and 0 for academic high schools ( licei classici, scientifici, lin-
uistici and psico-pedagogici ); area of residence in Southern Italy, which
s given by a dummy variable taking value 1 for individuals living in the
outhern regions and the two main Islands and 0 for individuals living
n the Northern and Central regions. 11 
At the completion of the university we control for variables measur-
ng financial resources, job preferences, and human capital. We proxy
he financial resources by using two dummy variables for having worked
uring university and having received a university scholarship, which
nly students from low income families are eligible for. To measure the
raduates ’ preferences for jobs with high degree of autonomy and in-
ependence and for jobs with high security, all graduates, at the com-
letion of university, are asked the following two questions: “How im-
ortant is high stability/security in the job you are looking for? ” and
How important is independence/autonomy in the job you are looking
or? ” The answers are reported in a 5-point scale, where 1 means “not
t all important ” and 5 means “extremely important ”. We measure the
references for job independence and security by considering the self-
eported levels of job preferences and their square terms. The variables
easuring human capital are: a dummy for having graduated from a
outh university; a set of dummy variables for the field of study; the
nal university grade standardised at department level by using all the
bservations available in the sample; 12 the interaction term between the
ummy for a Southern university and the standardised university final
rade 13 a set of dummy variables for 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 or more years de-
ayed graduation (no delay is the reference category), where the delay11 This dummy is included to capture potential variation in the quality of high school in 
outh regions. 
12 The unstandardised final degree ranges between 73 and 111 (i.e. 110 cum laude ) and 
ts mean and standard deviation are reported in Table A1. 
13 The dummy for a Southern university and its interaction with the standardised uni- 
ersity final grade are included to capture differences in the quality of the university in 
he South, but they can also capture potential differences in the probability of passing a 
icensing exam and starting a liberal profession in Southern regions. 
5
 
f  
s
112 s computed as additional number of years spent to get a degree beyond
he minimum period. 
To explain the probability to start a liberal profession, we consider
wo extra explanatory variables which are two dummy variables for hav-
ng passed the licensing exam between 13 and 36 months from gradu-
tion and between 37 and 60 months from graduation (having passed
he exam within 12 months from graduation is the reference category).
onditional on the remaining variables, a delay in passing the licensing
xam may be a signal of a lower human capital endowment. 
The bottom panel of Table A1 summarises the above variables by
eporting means and standard deviations using our sample of 24,309
raduates. The average high school final grade is about 49 (out of 60
aximum points) and only one in three individuals has a vocational
iploma. The average age at matriculation is 19, and only 4.7% of the
ndividuals complete their degree within the minimum required period.
1.6% of the graduates were resident in the South of Italy before starting
he university, but only 24.8% obtain their degree in a university located
n the South of Italy. 64.4% of people in our main sample have some
ork experience during university. On average the level of preference
or job security and independence is about 4, which is just below the
aximum level of preference which is 5. 
.2.3. Parents ’ occupation and education 
To study the effect of parents ’ occupation and education on the prob-
bility to choose a degree with access to liberal professions requiring
 period of compulsory practice, we consider a set of dummy vari-
bles to distinguish between fathers who are graduate liberal profes-
ionals, non-graduate liberal professionals, 14 managers, entrepreneurs,
elf-employed workers, non-manual workers and blue collars; having a
raduate father who is not a liberal professional; and two dummy vari-
bles for mothers who are graduate and non-graduate liberal profession-
ls. 15 
Both self-employed workers and entrepreneurs work on their own
ccount; but while entrepreneurs engage one or more employees on a
egular basis, self-employed workers do not usually engage employees.
iberal professionals are self-employed workers who provide a public
ervice which requires specific intellectual skills and an official license.
oth blue collar and non-manual workers are employees; but while the
ormer include unskilled and semi-skilled manual workers, the latter in-
lude technicians, teachers, clerical workers and lower supervisors. Fi-
ally, managers are employees who have high managerial occupations
uch as directors, business executive, head teachers, university profes-
ors and chief physicians. 
When modelling the probability to complete a compulsory period
f practice, to obtain or to pass a licensing exam and to start a liberal
rofession, we consider dummy variables for having a graduate liberal
rofessional father with the same degree, having a graduate liberal pro-
essional father with a different degree, having a liberal professional
other with the same degree, and having a liberal professional mother
ith a different degree or without a degree. Table A2 reports the mean
f each of the dummy variables describing the fathers ’ and mothers ’ oc-
upation and education in the sample of 24,309 graduates. More than
0% of the fathers are either blue collar or non-manual workers (19.1%
nd 31.5%, respectively), while 9.6% are liberal professionals, 4.6% are
raduate, of this 1.3% with the same degree. Only 1.9% of the mothers
re liberal professionals, whereof 0.1% with the same university degree.
. Measures of intergenerational association 
Let us denote the probability of a child of becoming a liberal pro-
essional within 5 years from graduation 16 conditioning on the father ’s14 For the parents ’ generation there are liberal professions that did not require a univer- 
ity degree, e.g. accountants. 
15 For parents who are retired, unemployed or dead we consider their last occupation. 
16 For brevity in the following we omit to specify “5 years from graduation ”. 
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Table 1 
Intergenerational associations in liberal professions: odds ratios. 
Father ’s occupation General odds ratios of being a liberal professional 
(1) (2) 
with or without with 
a compulsory practice 
Liberal professional 1.969 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.005 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.107) (0.121) 
Graduate liberal professional 2.440 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.584 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.174) (0.200) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 1.446 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.383 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.112) (0.122) 
No. of observations 24,309 
Father ’s occupation Profession specific odds ratios Compulsory practice length 
Pharmacist 74.416 ∗ ∗ 6 months 
(34.453) 
Accountant 12.438 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3 years 
(3.221) 
Notary and lawyer 9.540 ∗ ∗ ∗ 1.5–2 years 
(1.465) 
Architect 8.529 ∗ ∗ 6 months 
(2.312) 
Engineer 5.779 ∗ ∗ ∗ No 
(1.426) 
Geo-biologist 74.731 No 
(48.951) 
Agronomist 4.631 No 
(4.731) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. 
Notary and lawyer = liberal professional father with degree in Law. Accountant = liberal professional 
father with degree in Economics. Pharmacist = liberal professional father with degree in Pharmacy. 
Architect = liberal professional father with degree in Architecture. Engineer = liberal professional father 
with degree in Engineer. Geo-biologist = liberal professional father with degree in Geology or Biology. 
Agronomist = liberal professional father with degree in Agriculture. 
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17 We do not report the odds ratio separately for psychologists because there are only 
five fathers who are psychologists. 
18 For children we consider only liberal professions for which there is a compulsory 
period of practice. 
19 These average marginal effects are computed considering a probit model for the prob- 
ability to become a liberal professional and using the maximum likelihood estimates. ccupation by 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝑌 𝑓 = 1) , (1)
here Y c is a dummy variable taking value one if a child becomes a lib-
ral professional and zero otherwise, and Y f is a dummy variable taking
alue 1 if his/her father ’s is a liberal professional and zero otherwise.
e begin by reporting in Table 1 the odds ratios, i.e. the ratio of the odds
f being a liberal professional if one ’s father is a liberal professional to
he odds of it if one ’s father has a different occupation, 
𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 , 𝑌 𝑓 = 1) 𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 0 , 𝑌 𝑓 = 0) 
𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 , 𝑌 𝑓 = 0) 𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 0 , 𝑌 𝑓 = 1) 
. (2) 
he odds ratio measures the so called intergenerational exchange mo-
ility, which is unaffected by changes in the frequency of liberal pro-
essionals from the fathers to the children generation. It measures the
ssociation between becoming a liberal professional and having a lib-
ral professional father, which takes values greater (lower) than 1 when
he association is positive (negative). 
This odds ratio is reported in the first column in the top panel of
able 1 , while in the second column we report the equivalent odds ratio
hen considering only children who become liberal professionals after
 compulsory period of practice which are the type of liberal profes-
ions considered in our main analysis. In both cases, we find that the
dds to be a liberal professional if one ’s father is a liberal professional is
bout twice the corresponding odds than if one ’s father is not a liberal
rofessional. We also compute the odds ratios when considering lib-
ral professional fathers with and without a university degree and the
ransmission is much larger for graduate professional fathers (compare
econd and third row in Table 1 ). 
To check whether there are any differences in the degree of inter-
enerational transfer across liberal professions, we report the odds ratios
omputed by considering specific liberal professions in the bottom panel113 f Table 1 . 17 The odds ratios increase when considering liberal profes-
ions for which there is a compulsory period of practice, especially if it is
ong (see column 2). The largest odds ratio is observed for pharmacists
nd this is likely caused by strict regulations which limit the number of
ew pharmacies and increase the likelihood that pharmacies be trans-
itted from fathers to children (see Mocetti, 2016 ). For geo-biologists
nd agronomists, for whom there is no compulsory practice, the odds
atios are large but they are not significantly different from 1. These re-
ults seem to suggest that high entry barriers to the profession increase
he occupational transmission from fathers to children. 
. Intergenerational association: different mechanisms 
Let us consider the probability of a graduate of being a liberal pro-
essional conditioning on the father ’s occupation and education by 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝐷 𝑓 = 𝑗) , (3)
here 𝑗 = 1 , … , 7 ; Y c is a dummy variable taking value one if a graduate
ecomes a liberal professional and zero otherwise 18 D f is a categorical
ariable denoting his/her father ’s occupation, which takes value 1 for
raduate liberal professionals, 2 for non-graduate liberal professionals,
 for managers, 4 for self-employed workers, 5 for non-manual workers,
 for blue collar workers and 7 for entrepreneurs. 
In column (1) of Table 2 we report the average marginal effects of
aving a father in a specific occupation relative to having a father who is
n entrepreneur on the probability of becoming a liberal professional, 19 
hich are computed using the following formula 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝐷 𝑓 = 𝑗) − 𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝐷 𝑓 = 7) for 𝑗 = 1 , … , 6 . (4)
C. Aina, C. Nicoletti Labour Economics 51 (2018) 108–120 
Table 2 
Probability of becoming a liberal professional - probit model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal effect controlling for 
nothing financial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.082 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.079 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.082 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.087 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.051 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.055 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.007 − 0.019 − 0.010 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Manager − 0.022 ∗ ∗ − 0.022 ∗ ∗ − 0.017 ∗ − 0.020 ∗ ∗ − 0.030 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Self-employed − 0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.025 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.022 ∗ ∗ − 0.027 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.024 ∗ ∗ − 0.019 ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Non-manual worker − 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.041 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.044 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.037 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) 
Blue collar − 0.054 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.047 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.053 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.052 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.043 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables are: 
(2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job independence 
and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school final mark, university in 
the South, standardised university grade, interaction between South university and standardised university grade, dummies for 
graduation with delay; (5) graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate and 
non-liberal professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of all graduates. 
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s  e choose as reference category for the father ’s occupation the en-
repreneurs because their expected income is similar to the one of liberal
rofessionals and both liberal professionals and entrepreneurs work on
heir own account, so that fathers with these two types of occupations
re likely to transmit to their children similar job preferences (especially
references for job independence and risk) and financial resources. 20 To
nderstand how the choice of the reference category affects our results,
e also report in the Appendix A the corresponding results when con-
idering blue collars as reference category (see Appendix A Table A3).
he differential effect of having a liberal professional father increases
hen considering blue collars (see Table A3 column 1) rather than en-
repreneurs (see Table 2 column 1), it goes from 8.2 to 13.6 percentage
oints, suggesting that the transmission of financial resources and job
references from parents to children is more comparable between lib-
ral professionals and entrepreneurs than between liberal professionals
nd blue collars. 
To assess the role of different mechanisms in explaining the intergen-
rational association in liberal professions, we also compute the average
arginal effect of having a father in different types of occupations on
he probability of a child of becoming a liberal professional when con-
rolling for a vector of characteristics X which captures family financial
esources, job preferences and formal human capital. We do this by es-
imating a probit model for the probability to become a liberal profes-
ional 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝐷 𝑓 , 𝑋) = Φ( − 𝛼0 − 𝑋𝛿 − 6 ∑
𝑗=1 
𝐈 ( 𝐃 𝐟 = 𝐣 ) 𝛂𝐣 
) 
, (5)
here Φ denotes the cumulative function of the standardised normal, X
s a row vector of explanatory variables, 𝛿 is the corresponding column
ector of coefficients, 𝐈 ( 𝐃 𝐟 = 𝐣 ) is an indicator function taking value one
f the father has occupation j and zero otherwise, and 𝛼j is the corre-
ponding coefficient which measures the effect of having a father with
ccupation j with respect to having a father who is an entrepreneur (ref-
rence category). The average marginal effect of having a father who is
 graduate liberal professional with respect to a father who is an en-20 Using the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) of the Bank of Italy over 
he period 1998–2010, we find a very close value for the average net income of males who 
re liberal professionals and who are entrepreneurs, Euros 35,487 and 36,566 respectively. 
sing our main sample, we also find a similar value for the average level of preference 
or job independence (security) between children of liberal professionals with the same 
egree and children of entrepreneurs, 4.016 and 3.951 (3.958 and 3.880) respectively. 
p  
(  
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f  
114 repreneur is computed by considering the following difference in prob-
bilities 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝐷 𝑓 = 1 , 𝑋) − 𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝐷 𝑓 = 7 , 𝑋) = Φ(− 𝛼0 − 𝑋𝛿 − 𝛼1 ) 
−Φ(− 𝛼0 − 𝑋𝛿) , (6) 
eplacing the coefficients with their maximum likelihood estimates and
veraging over the full sample. The average marginal effects for fathers
ith other occupations are computed in a similar way. 
Table 2 reports the average marginal effects of having a father in
pecific occupations on the probability to become a liberal professional
nconditional on covariates i.e. controlling for: nothing (column 1); fi-
ancial resources (column 2); job preferences (column 3); formal human
apital (HC) at the start of the university and at the completion of the
niversity (column 4); parental human capital (HC) (column 5); and all
ariables together (column 6). The detailed list of variables is reported
t the bottom of Table 2 . Each column reports the average marginal ef-
ects of having a father with different types of occupation with respect
o having an entrepreneur father but using a different set of variables X .
The effect of having a non-graduate liberal professional father is not
ignificantly different from zero; conversely, the effect of having a grad-
ate liberal professional father is 0.082 but reduces to 0.055 once con-
rolled for all observed variables (see Table 2 columns 1 and 6). This
esidual captures the effects of nepotism and family networking and,
nly for liberal professional fathers with the same degree, the transmis-
ion of job specific formal human capital and family business. In the
ollowing section we better identify and explain the separate contribu-
ion of these residual mechanisms. 
. The effect of mechanisms on different processes 
In this section we decompose the probability of becoming a liberal
rofessional in the product of four sequential probabilities, which are
he probabilities of (I.a) choosing a degree with access to a liberal profes-
ion which requires a compulsory period of practice, (I.b) completing a
eriod of compulsory practice, (I.c) obtaining a professional license and
I.d) starting a liberal profession. Furthermore, we allow each of these
robability processes to be explained differently by observed character-
stics, which are measures of financial resources, job preferences, child ’s
ormal human capital, parental occupation and education, by estimating
C. Aina, C. Nicoletti Labour Economics 51 (2018) 108–120 
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p  he four following sequential probit models 
 𝐼.𝑎 ] Pr 
(
𝑌 𝑐 1 = 1 
|||𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 1 ) = Φ(𝑋 𝐶 𝛽1 + 𝑍 1 𝛾1 ), 
 𝐼.𝑏 ] Pr 
(
𝑌 𝑐 2 = 1 
|||𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 2 , 𝑌 𝑐 1 = 1 ) = Φ(𝑋 𝐶 𝛽1 + 𝑍 2 𝛾1 ), 
 𝐼.𝑐 ] Pr 
(
𝑌 𝑐 3 = 1 
|||𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 2 , 𝑌 𝑐 2 = 1 ) = Φ(𝑋 𝐶 𝛽2 + 𝑍 2 𝛾2 ), 
 𝐼.𝑑 ] Pr 
(
𝑌 𝑐 4 = 1 
|||𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 3 , 𝑌 𝑐 3 = 1 ) = Φ(𝑋 𝐶 𝛽3 + 𝑍 3 𝛾3 ), 
(7) 
here 𝑌 𝑐 1 , 𝑌 
𝑐 
2 , 𝑌 
𝑐 
3 and 𝑌 
𝑐 
4 , are dummy variables which take value 1 re-
pectively if the child chooses a degree with access to a liberal profession
hich requires a compulsory period of practice, completes a compulsory
eriod of practice, passes the licensing exam and starts a liberal profes-
ion; Φ denotes the cumulative function of the standardised normal; X C 
s a vector of common explanatory variables for all four models, which
ncludes a constant and the set of dummies for different father ’s occupa-
ions with the usual reference category “entrepreneur ”; Z s is a vector of
xtra explanatory variables; and 𝛽s and 𝛾s are the vectors of coefficients
or X C and Z s . The list of explanatory variables used for each of the four
odels are described in Table 3 . 
We can express the probability of a graduate of becoming a liberal
rofessional as the product of the above four conditional probabilities,
.e. 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 = 1 |𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍) = 𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 1 = 1 |𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 1 ) 𝑃 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 2 = 1 |𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 2 , 𝑌 𝑐 1 = 1) 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 3 = 1 |𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 2 , 𝑌 𝑐 2 = 1 , 𝑌 𝑐 1 = 1) 
 𝑟 ( 𝑌 𝑐 4 = 1 |𝑋 𝐶 , 𝑍 3 , 𝑌 𝑐 3 = 1 , 𝑌 𝑐 2 = 1 , 𝑌 𝑐 1 = 1) . (8) 
herefore, the effect of having a liberal professional father in each of
hese probability models captures the strength of transmission of liberal
rofessions through each of the four sequential processes. 
In Tables 4–7 we report the average marginal effects of having a
ather in each of the different occupations with respect to having an en-
repreneur father on the four probabilities processes, unconditional on
ovariates i.e. controlling for: nothing (column 1); financial resources (col-
mn 2); job preferences (column 3); formal human capital (HC) (column
); parental human capital (HC) (column 5); and all variables together
column 6). 21 In Appendix B we also consider the same sequential model
stimated using a joint quadrivariate probit model (see Table B1) and
esults are similar. 
The choice of a degree which provides access to a liberal profession
s taken before starting the university, therefore to explain the degree
hoice we consider only explanatory variables which are observed be-
ore or at the start of the university. Consequently, we do not control for
he job preferences, which are reported after the completion of the de-
ree, the dummies for having had a scholarship and having worked dur-
ng the university, and the university final grade. Nevertheless, because
ur reference category for the father ’s occupation is the entrepreneur
nd because the intergenerational transmission of job preferences, fi-
ancial resources and formal human capital is likely to be similar for
ntrepreneur and liberal professional fathers, we believe that our esti-
ated effect of having a father liberal professional in column (6) is net
f these three transmission mechanisms. 
We find that the average marginal effect of having a father who is
 graduate liberal professional is not statistically significantly different
rom having a father who is an entrepreneur. 22 On the contrary, the
ffect of having a graduate liberal professional father is statistically sig-
ificantly higher than having a father who is a blue collar (see Table
5a). These results suggest that after controlling for transmission of fi-
ancial resources, job preferences and formal human capital, which are
ikely to be similar for fathers who are entrepreneurs and who are grad-
ate liberal professionals, the residual transmission mechanisms do not
lay a role in explaining the degree choice. 21 The effects of the remaining explanatory variables for each of the probit models when 
ontrolling for all variables together are reported in Appendix A Table A4. 
22 Henceforth when speaking about significance we mean statistically significance at 5% 
evel. i
115 We find a negative effect of having a father who is a non-graduate
iberal professional with respect to having an entrepreneur father (see
econd row in Table 4 ), which persists even after controlling of all ex-
lanatory variables observed before or at the start of the university.
he differential effect can be caused by the difference in the transmis-
ion of human capital given that we now consider a liberal professional
ather who is not graduate. Conversely, we find no effect of having a
ather who is a non-graduate liberal professional with respect to hav-
ng a father who is a blue collar (see Table A5a). This seems to suggest
hat non-graduate liberal professionals transmit to their child a level of
ormal human capital similar to the blue-collars ’ one and lower than
he entrepreneurs ’ one. We find similar types of results also when we
onsider the probability of choosing a degree providing access to lib-
ral professions without restricting the professions to the ones requiring
 compulsory period of practice. 23 Ultimately, our results suggest that
hildren of liberal professional fathers are not more likely to choose de-
rees which provide access to liberal professions. 
Looking at the probability to complete a period of practice without
ontrolling for any variable (see Table 5 column (1)), we find a large ef-
ect of having a liberal professional father, 26.1, 12.7 ad 9.1 percentage
oints for liberal professional fathers with the same degree, with a dif-
erent degree and with no degree. This effect does not seem explained
y the observed variables measuring job preferences and financial re-
ources (see columns (2) and (3)), but it is explained by the transmission
f formal human capital. Once controlled for all covariates, the effects
educe of about 30%, 80% and 60% for liberal professional fathers with
he same degree, with a different degree and without a degree, respec-
ively. Findings are very similar when considering as reference category
athers who are blue collars rather than entrepreneurs (See Table A5b).
hese similarities in results reinforce our belief that it is not the trans-
ission of financial resources and job preferences (which are similar
etween liberal professionals and entrepreneurs but not between liberal
rofessionals and blue collars) that explain the effect of having a liberal
rofessional father on the probability to complete a compulsory period
f practice. 
Notice that most of the effect of liberal professional fathers without
 degree or with a different degree on the probability of their child to
omplete a compulsory period of practice cancels out once controlled
or all covariates. This suggests there are no other relevant mechanisms
hrough which the intergenerational transmission affects the probabil-
ty of completing a compulsory period of practice. On the contrary, the
ffect of liberal professional fathers with the same degree remains large
ven after controlling for the transmission of formal human capital, im-
lying that there are other relevant mechanisms, in particular the nepo-
ism and family networking and the transmission of job specific infor-
al human capital and of family business. We try to net out the effect
f transmission of family business by excluding all individuals who re-
ort that they are working in a family business 5 years after graduation
rrelevant of their occupation, and we find that the effect of having a
iberal professional father with the same degree after controlling for all
ovariates is still very large (see Appendix A Table A6). This seems to
uggest that the transmission of family business has probably a small
ole in explaining the probability to complete a period of compulsory
ractice. 
Because all individuals who complete a compulsory period of prac-
ice do attempt to pass the licensing exam, we can interpret the esti-
ated effect of having a liberal professional father on the probability of
btaining a license as the effect on the probability of passing a licens-
ng exam. By comparing our probability of passing a licensing exam by
ype of liberal profession with the corresponding licensing passing rate
ublished in “Il Sole 24 Ore ”, 24 we find indeed that our licensing suc-23 Results are available upon request to the authors. 
24 “Il Sole 24 Ore ” is the main Italian daily business newspaper and we considered the 
ssue published on the 7th of January 2013. 
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Table 3 
Control variables in the four sequential processes. 
Probability of Control variables for 
father ’s occupation financial resources job preferences formal HC parental HC 
I.a - choosing a Graduate liberal professional Age at enrolment and its square term Graduate liberal 
degree providing Non-graduate liberal professional Vocational high school professional mother 
access to liberal Manager High school final mark Non-graduate liberal 
professions requiring Self-employed Living in Southern regions professional mother 
a compulsory Non-manual worker Non-graduate and non-liberal 
practice period Blue collar professional father 
Father ’s occupation (1): Financial resources (1): Job preferences (1): Formal HC (1): Parental HC (1): 
Graduate liberal professional with the same degree Having worked Job stability and Age at enrolment and its square term Graduate liberal professional 
I.b - completing a Graduate liberal professional with a different degree during university its square term Vocational high school mother with the same degree 
compulsory Non-graduate liberal professional Having received a Job independence and High school final mark Non-graduate or graduate with a different 
period of practice Manager scholarship its square term Field of study degree liberal professional mother 
Self-employed University in the South Non-graduate and non-liberal 
Non-manual worker Std. university grade professional father 
Blue collar Interaction between South university 
and std. university grade 
Graduation with delay 
I.c - passing a Father ’s occupation (1) Financial resources (1) Job preferences (1) Formal HC (1) Parental HC (1) 
professional license See above list See above list See above list See above list See above list 
Father ’s occupation (1) Financial resources (1) Job preferences (1) Formal HC (1) plus Parental HC (1) 
I.d - starting a See above list See above list See above list having passed licensing See above list 
liberal profession exam 3 years and 
5 years after 
graduation 
1
1
6
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Table 4 
Probability of choosing a degree providing access to liberal professions requiring a compulsory period of practice [I.a] - probit 
model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal effect controlling for 
nothing financial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional − 0.001 0.023 − 0.001 0.008 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) 
Non-graduate liberal professional − 0.106 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.096 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.107 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.111 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.021) 
Manager − 0.079 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.059 ∗ ∗ − 0.078 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.063 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Self-employed − 0.076 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.077 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.076 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.075 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
Non-manual worker − 0.116 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.109 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.116 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.109 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
Blue collar − 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.133 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.131 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 24,309 24,309 24,309 24,309 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables 
are: (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school final mark, living in Southern regions; 
(5) graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate liberal professional mother, non-graduate and non-liberal professional 
father; (6) all control variables. Sample of all graduates. 
Table 5 
Probability of completing a compulsory period of practice [I.b] - probit model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal effect controlling for 
nothing financial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.261 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.250 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.261 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.190 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.236 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.178 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
with the same degree (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.026) (0.026) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.127 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.117 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.129 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.040 ∗ 0.086 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.027 
with a different degree (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.030) (0.026) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.091 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.090 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.094 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.042 ∗ ∗ 0.048 ∗ 0.037 ∗ 
(0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.022) 
Manager 0.032 ∗ 0.024 0.042 ∗ ∗ − 0.003 0.015 − 0.004 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
Self-employed 0.003 0.000 0.011 0.001 0.010 0.010 
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) 
Non-manual worker 0.039 ∗ ∗ 0.029 ∗ 0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.003 0.038 ∗ ∗ 0.003 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014) 
Blue collar 0.001 − 0.007 0.010 − 0.009 0.007 0.004 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 11,308 11,308 11,308 11,308 11,308 11,308 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables 
are: (2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job 
independence and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school 
final mark, university in the South, field of study, standardised university grade, interaction between South university 
and standardised university grade, dummies for graduation with delay; (5) graduate liberal professional mother with the 
same degree, non-graduate or graduate with ad different degree liberal professional mother, non-graduate and non-liberal 
professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of graduates who chose a degree with access to liberal professions 
which require a compulsory period of practice. 
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m  ess rates are comparable or even slightly higher. For this reason, we
ename the probability of obtaining a license conditional on completing
 practice period as the probability of passing the licensing exam. 
Looking at the results for the probability of passing a licensing exam
onditional on having completed a compulsory period of practice in
able 6 , we find that the effect of having a liberal professional father is
t most of 6 percentage points when omitting to control for any covari-
te and it is completely explained by the transmission of formal human
apital. These results suggest that neither nepotism nor the transmis-
ion of job specific skills affect the probability to pass a licensing exam.
otice that family networking and the transmission of family business
annot affect the probability to pass a licensing exam because the only
ay they could have an effect is through nepotism. These results areg  
117 onfirmed when blue collar fathers are used as reference category (see
able A5c). 
Finally, looking at the probability of starting a liberal profession
ithout controlling for any covariate (see column (1) Table 7 ), we find
n average marginal effect of 13.5 and 7 percentage points for liberal
rofessional fathers with the same degree and with a different degree,
nd no statistically significant effect for fathers who are non-graduate
iberal professionals. Controlling for all covariates, the effect of liberal
rofessional fathers with the same degree reduces to 8.4 percentage
oints and makes the effect of liberal professional fathers with a differ-
nt degree statistically insignificant. Financial resources and job pref-
rences do not seem to explain any of these effects; whereas variables
easuring formal human capital such the standardised university de-
ree and the dummy variables for a delayed graduation, have a statis-
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Table 6 
Probability of passing a licensing exam [I.c] - probit model estimates. 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal effect controlling for 
nothing financial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.054 0.054 0.054 0.048 ∗ 0.016 0.038 
with the same degree (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.038) (0.030) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.063 ∗ ∗ 0.062 ∗ ∗ 0.063 ∗ ∗ 0.010 0.027 del- − 0.000 
with a different degree (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.034) (0.029) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.060 ∗ ∗ 0.058 ∗ ∗ 0.061 ∗ ∗ 0.007 0.022 del- − 0.001 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.024) (0.032) (0.027) 
Manager 0.003 0.002 0.003 − 0.031 ∗ − 0.014 − 0.034 ∗ 
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) 
Self-employed − 0.014 − 0.019 − 0.013 − 0.030 − 0.009 − 0.027 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.019) 
Non-manual worker − 0.010 − 0.019 − 0.009 − 0.045 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.011 − 0.044 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) 
Blue collar − 0.019 − 0.036 − 0.017 − 0.049 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.013 − 0.044 ∗ ∗ 
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 7,899 7,899 7,899 7,899 7,899 7,899 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables 
are: (2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job 
independence and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school 
final mark, university in the South, field of study, standardised university grade, interaction between South university 
and standardised university grade, dummies for graduation with delay; (5) graduate liberal professional mother with the 
same degree, non-graduate or graduate with ad different degree liberal professional mother, non-graduate and non-liberal 
professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of graduates who chose a degree with access to liberal professions 
which require a compulsory period of practice and completed a compulsory period of practice. 
Table 7 
Probability of starting a liberal profession [I.d] - probit model estimates . 
Father ’s occupation Average marginal effect controlling for 
nothing financial job formal parental all 
resources preferences HC HC variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.135 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.139 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.133 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ 0.102 ∗ ∗ 0.084 ∗ ∗ 
with the same degree (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) (0.048) (0.041) 
Graduate liberal professional 0.070 ∗ 0.072 ∗ 0.069 ∗ 0.053 0.036 0.030 
with a different degree (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.035) (0.044) (0.038) 
Non-graduate liberal professional 0.010 0.008 0.015 0.024 − 0.024 0.006 
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.041) (0.035) 
Manager − 0.042 − 0.038 − 0.033 − 0.033 − 0.056 ∗ − 0.037 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.029) (0.025) 
Self-employed − 0.037 − 0.030 − 0.029 − 0.006 − 0.032 0.003 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) 
Non-manual worker − 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.085 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.084 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.058 ∗ ∗ − 0.099 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.047 ∗ ∗ 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.026) (0.023) 
Blue collar − 0.113 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.096 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.098 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.061 ∗ ∗ − 0.108 ∗ ∗ ∗ − 0.041 
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028) (0.025) 
Entrepreneur (reference category) 
No. of observations 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601 5,601 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parenthesis. ∗ p -value < .10, ∗ ∗ p -value < .05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p -value < .01. Control variables are: 
(2) having worked and having received a scholarship during university; (3) job stability and its square term, job independence 
and its square term; (4) age at enrolment and its square term, vocational high school track, high school final mark, university 
in the South, field of study, standardised university grade, interaction between South university and standardised university 
grade, dummies for graduation with delay, having passed the licensing exam 3 years and 5 years after graduation; (5) graduate 
liberal professional mother with the same degree, non-graduate or graduate with ad different degree liberal professional 
mother, non-graduate and non-liberal professional father; (6) all control variables. Sample of graduates who chose a degree 
with access to liberal professions which require a compulsory period of practice, completed a compulsory practice period and 
passed a licensing exam. 
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f  ically significant average marginal effect on the probability to start a
iberal profession but of opposite sign to the one expected (see Table
4). Because higher quality human capital decreases the probability to
tart a liberal professional, we infer that the selection into starting a
iberal profession is not meritocratic. The lack of meritocracy makes us
lso think that it is not the transmission of job specific skills that pro-
ides an advantage to children of graduate liberal professionals with the
ame degree, but rather the transmission of the business or nepotism. To
etter disentangle these two residual mechanisms, we also estimate the118 verage marginal effect of having a liberal professional father excluding
ll individuals who are working in a family business 5 years after grad-
ation irrelevant of their occupation. We find that the effect of having
 liberal professional fathers with the same degree, after controlling for
ll covariates, becomes statistically insignificant (see Appendix A Table
7), which suggests that the inheritance of the family business plays a
ig role in explaining the probability to start a liberal profession. 
In conclusion, our main findings are the following: (i) the largest ef-
ect of having a liberal professional father is observed when a father has
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L  he same degree as his child, (ii) having a father liberal professional does
ot increase the probability to choose a degree with access to liberal pro-
essions requiring a compulsory practice; (iii) the transmission of human
apital (probably both formal and informal) is the main mechanism ex-
laining the probability to complete a compulsory period of practice
ollowed by family networking and/or nepotism; (iv) the transmission
f formal human capital is the main and only mechanism explaining the
robability to pass a licensing exam after completed a compulsory pe-
iod of practice; (v) the transmission of the family business and probably
epotism are the main mechanisms explaining the probability to start a
iberal profession after completed a compulsory period of practice and
assed a licensing exam. 
. Conclusions 
In this paper we studied the mechanisms and processes of trans-
ission of liberal professions from fathers to children. Using data on
2 Italian universities, we find that there is a very strong intergenera-
ional transmission. The odds of being a liberal professional for children
f liberal professionals is twice the corresponding odds for children of
on-professionals and it is especially large for liberal professions with
igh entry barriers, in particular accountants, lawyers, notaries, psy-
hologists, pharmacists and architects for which a compulsory period of
ractice is required. 
Our empirical results also suggest that nepotism does not play a role
n explaining the probability of passing a licensing exam, but it might
xplain the probability of starting a liberal profession once a licensing
xam is passed and as a matter of fact we find a negative relationship
etween formal human capital and the probability to start a liberal pro-
ession. Furthermore, the transmission of the family business seems to
lay a substantial role in explaining the effect of having a father liberal
rofessional with the same degree on the probability to start a liberal
rofession. The process of completing a compulsory period of practice is
t least in part meritocratic, but it can also be partly explained by family
etworking which disproportionably advantages children of liberal pro-
essionals. This would suggest that high-ability children with no family
embers in the profession could be helped in starting a liberal profes-
ion by introducing (i) mentoring schemes where senior professionals
et incentives to provide advice and help prospective professionals, (ii)
rogrammes to help graduates in finding members of the relevant pro-
essional body available to supervise them for a period of practice, (iii)
iberalisation reforms that increase competition and lower the entry bar-
ier. Fairlie and Robb (2007) draw a similar type of conclusion from
heir study on the effect of having a father who is a business owner on
he probability of children to become self-employed. 
Our findings are aligned with previous empirical evidence on liberal
rofessions in Italy suggesting that one of the main reasons for the in-
ergenerational transmission is that having a liberal professional father
elps in lowering the entry barrier and this might lead to favouritism
see Mocetti, 2016 , for pharmacists, Pellizzari and Pica, 2011 and
asso and Pellizzari, 2010 , for lawyers). Our study generalises previous
tudies to all types of liberal professions by providing evidence that part
f the intergenerational transmission of liberal professions is explained
y transmission of the family business, networking and potentially nepo-
ism. 
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